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TRAITORS AND THE MEANING OF TREASON IN
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S GREAT WAR
1
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By Mark CornwallQ13
READ 26 SEPTEMBER 20144
ABSTRACT. Treason is a ubiquitous historical phenomenon, one particularly
associated with regime instability or wartime loyalties. This paper explores the
practice and prosecution of treason in the last decades of the Habsburg monarchy
with a special focus on some notorious wartime treason trials. It first sets the rhetoric
and law of treason in a comparative historical context before assessing the legal
framework supplied by the Austrian penal code of 1852. Although the treason law
was exploited quite arbitrarily after 1914, the state authorities in the pre-war decade
were already targeting irredentist suspects due to major anxiety about domestic and
foreign security. In the Great War, the military were then given extensive powers
to prosecute all political crimes including treason, causing a string of show-trials
of Bosnian Serbs and some leading Czech politicians. By 1917–18, however, this
onslaught on disloyalty was backfiring in the wake of an imperial amnesty: as loyalties
shifted away from the Habsburg regime, the former criminals themselves proudly
began to assume the title of ‘traitor’. The paper is a case-study of how regimes in
crisis have used treason as a powerful moral instrument for managing allegiance. It
also offers a new basis for understanding instability in the late Habsburg monarchy.
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In early 1919, a few months after Czechoslovakia declared independence21
from the Austro-Hungarian empire, a former Habsburg military judge22
travelled by train from Prague to Vienna. During the war, Jaroslav23
Kunz had headed one of Vienna’s military courts, but he was now in24
Czechoslovak service and keen to assert his new patriotism. He was25
visiting the Austrian capital to collect his mother and sister and repatriate26
them but he was also there on a special mission. The Czechoslovak prime27
minister, Karel Krama´rˇ, and others in the government had asked him to28
locate the archive of the notorious Czech treason trials of 1914–17 and29
to claim it as Czechoslovak property. When Kunz finally tracked down30
the records to the court house where he himself had worked, he was31
horrified at what he found. Not only were thousands of court documents32
– protocols, letters and photographs – strewn all over the floor. They were33
being fed by soldiers into a stove in order to heat the building. ‘It was a34
true picture of Austrian disintegration’, wrote Kunz later: ‘So ended the35
infamous work of Austrian military justice!’1 He finally found fragments36
1 Jaroslav Kunz, Na´sˇ odboj v zrcadle rakouske´ vojenske´ justice (Prague, 1930), 6–10.
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of Czech treason material, had them packed in boxes and sent back to37
Prague. Over the next decade, he would reproduce them in colourful38
reminiscences, peering behind the black and yellow Habsburg curtain so39
that, as he said, ‘we do not forget the cage in which we lived’.240
Many documents from the wartime trials in Vienna had been41
destroyed, or – in the case of the most famous Russophile trial3 – never42
seem to have undergone archival repatriation. In the Czech case, since43
1919, most have remained unsorted in Prague and ignored by historians.44
In part, this document-diaspora explains why the history of high treason45
(Hochverrat) in wartime Austria-Hungary has been so neglected. Usually46
in the past century, those writing about the subject have had a national-47
political agenda – on behalf of the ‘national traitors’ – to demonstrate48
their righteous struggle under the Habsburg yoke. This was especially49
true in the mass of Czech memoirs that surfaced in the interwar period,50
recalling Czech martyrdom in Vienna’s so-called ‘Prison of Death’. From51
that ‘Viennese bastille’ the traitors had survived en masse to tell their52
story, to bolster a new Czech national narrative, while the voices of their53
accusers were silent since the Habsburg regime had lost its legitimacy. In54
contrast, in the new state of Yugoslavia after the Great War, there was55
a much fainter echo of the court trials conducted against Bosnian Serb56
traitors.4 In fact it was not until the late 1980s, when Serbian nationalism57
was suddenly resurgent in Yugoslavia, that some popular and academic58
interest was aroused in the mass treason trials of Bosnian Serbs.5 Some59
Serbian historians then rekindled the subject to meet a contemporary60
agenda, showing how the myth of the traitor has often been cyclically61
exploited in nationalist narratives.62
To paraphrase the German journalist Margret Boveri, let us take a63
walk in this Austro-Hungarian ‘landscape of treason’, for it is a very64
instructive ramble for any historian.6 Treason, of course, is historically65
ubiquitous and the ultimate political crime. It always involves some kind66
of power struggle, a perceived challenge to existing authority, or a threat to67
an established political community that may endanger state security. The68
cry of ‘treason’ or ‘traitor’ has consistently been invoked over the centuries69
as a linguistic device with which to disarm a political opponent, a way70
of publicly branding some disloyalty to a cause or community. But more71
2 Jaroslav Kunz, Za cˇernozˇlutou oponou. Z Vı´denˇsky´ch vzpomı´nek (Prague, 1921), 5.
3 That of the Ruthene politician Dimitrij Markov in the summer of 1915.
4 For example, Vladimir C´orovic´, Crna knjiga. Patnje Srba Bosne i Hercegovine za vreme svetskog
rata 1914–1918 (Belgrade and Sarajevo, 1920).
5 See the useful proceedings of a Bosnian conference from 1986, collected in Veleizdajnicˇki
proces u Banjaluci. Zbornik radova, ed. Galib Sˇljivo (Banjaluka, 1987); and the more popular
nationalist work by Djordje Beatovic´ and Dragoljub Milanovic´, Veleizdajnicˇki procesi Srbima u
Austro-Ugarskoj (Belgrade, 1989).
6 Margret Boveri, Der Verrat im 20. Jahrhundert (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1976), 7.
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concretely, the concept of treason was and is embedded in most states’72
criminal codes, constituting there ‘the heaviest and most cumbersome73
weapon in the fight for political power’.774
Whether rhetorically or judicially, treason has always been pronounced75
as the most abominable act. Just as the thirteenth century English jurist76
Henry de Bracton advised that it exceeded all other crimes, so Edward77
Coke when condemning the Gunpowder plotters in 1606 piled up his78
metaphors to describe the insidious, covert world of the traitor: ‘For79
Treason is like a tree whose root is full of poison, and lyeth secret and80
hid within the earth’; it required the severest punishment imaginable81
(hanging, drawing and quartering).8 Three centuries later, at the trial of82
Roger Casement in 1916, another attorney general F. E Smith opened his83
prosecution by stressing treason as ‘the most heinous crime’, while the84
judge later directed the jury: it was ‘the gravest known to the law’ and85
(in wartime) ‘almost too grave for expression’.9 An Austrian jurist around86
the same time defined Hochverrat as a peculiar crime which, because of its87
special dangers and unforeseeable consequences, deserved the harshest88
penalty.1089
The treason trial well into the twentieth century was the ultimate90
theatre for a public power struggle, where regimes would don a mask of91
legality in order to eliminate those identified as traitors. In this process,92
the traitor was always demonised, for in all cases of treason the struggle93
for power is interpreted in moral terms: allegedly, the moral universe of94
the community, the collective, has been violated by one of their own who95
has become a traitor.11 In the sixteenth century, the traitor might still be96
interpreted as Satan’s agent working against God’s anointed.12 By the97
twentieth, he was more likely, as in the case of Casement’s ‘homosexual98
depravity’, to be simply stigmatised or pathologised for his base character99
traits. The violent language deployed for this purpose crossed all borders100
and cultures. It could be extreme when the final contest was actually a101
show-trial with minimal defence and no redress. Thus, in Hungary in102
1950, the traitors in one Stalinist show-trial were described as the ‘scum103
7 Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends (Princeton,
1961), 76.
8 Coke’s words, in A True and Perfect Relation of the Whole Proceedings against the Most Barbarous
Traitors (1606), D4; J. G. Bellamy, The Law of Treason in England in the Late Middle Ages
(Cambridge, 1970), 7.
9 Trial of Roger Casement, ed. H. Montgomery Hyde (1960), 7, 179. See similarly: The Trial
of William Joyce, ed. C. E. Bechhofer Roberts (1946), 30.
10Das Strafgesetz u¨ber Verbrechen, Vergehen und Uebertretungen: nebst den hiezu erflossenen
Nachtragsgesetzen, Oesterreichische Gesetzeskunde, II), ed. Ludwig Altmann (Vienna, 1913),
62.
11 Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Betrayals and Treason: Violations of Trust and Loyalty (Boulder, CO,
and Oxford, 2001), 125.
12 Lacey Baldwin Smith, Treason in Tudor England. Politics and Paranoia (1986), 129–38.
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of society’ who had turned to treason ‘because of their cowardly and104
vacillating characters’.13 In 2013, the uncle of North Korea’s dictator was105
executed because he was ‘despicable human scum, worse than a dog106
[who had] perpetrated thrice-cursed acts of treachery’; history would107
never forget his ‘shuddering crimes’.14108
In all these cases, though the treason was socially constructed and109
peculiar to its era, the regime usually defined the crime in universal110
terms, emphasising a timeless morality which the traitor had transgressed.111
Sometimes – rarely – the power struggle ended with the traitor’s victory.112
More often, the moral construction of treason was turned on its head by113
the accused. The traitors – whether the earl of Strafford in 1641, Casement114
in 1916 or the Norwegian fascist Vidkun Quisling in 1945 – might at their115
trial take a final stand for posterity, publicly appealing to history or some116
higher power in order to challenge the court’s moral superiority and foster117
some posthumous legacy of their own.15 Many traitors, if given a voice,118
pointed the finger of treason at their accusers, identifying them as the real119
traitors to the wider community.120
I121
In the late Habsburg monarchy, we can find many features of this122
generic landscape of treason. Those put on trial were usually stigmatised123
as ‘depraved’ and misguided individuals who had no moral compass.124
Not only had they cunningly plotted for years to undermine the natural125
order, but the entangled roots of their treason finally flourished in some126
monstrous enterprise. Thus, in 1916, the prosecutor at the trial of Karel127
Krama´rˇ would claim that the seeds of his ‘ignominious treason’ had128
effectively caused the First World War.16 The fact that such treason trials129
were so prolific in Austria-Hungary’s final decade requires an explanation.130
It fully matches a pattern where traitors are usually sought and found131
during periods of regime instability or in wartime, when loyalty to the132
state has to be publicly displayed, and an example made of any prominent133
individuals who seem to be disloyal.134
A deeper consideration is where we should place the late Habsburg135
monarchy in the broader landscape of treason (where the historiography136
13 The concluding speech of the prosecutor Gyula Alapi, in La´szlo´ Ra´jk and his Accomplices
before the People’s Court (Budapest, 1949), 272–3: ‘The only defence against mad dogs is to beat
them to death.’
14 Guardian, 14 Dec. 2013, 3.
15 See for example Strafford’s defence in J. P. Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution. Documents
and Commentary (Cambridge, 1966), 194–5; Casement, ed. Montgomery Hyde, 200–4; Oddvar
Hoidal, Quisling: A Study in Treason (Oslo, 1989), 754, 764.
16Archiv U´stavu TGM (AU´TGM: Archive of the T.G. Masaryk Institute, Prague), Fond
Maffie, karton 39, XIII: Markus Preminger’s concluding speech at the Krama´rˇ trial, 3845–6.
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is singularly weak for the modern era).17 Austria-Hungary in the early137
twentieth century sat on the edge of two worlds, with treason still mainly138
signifying disloyalty to the Habsburg monarch and his empire. In contrast,139
treason for the rest of the twentieth century was increasingly interpreted140
ideologically, as a question of allegiance to a political system, whether141
communist, fascist or democratic-capitalist. By the twentieth-first century,142
with Edward Snowden labelled alternatively as a traitor or a ‘whistle-143
blower’, it has become far more problematic to find the meaning of144
treason or to pinpoint where individuals owe their loyalty in a global145
world. In short, as Britain has recently found with young jihadists, treason146
has become far harder for states to police.147
The charge of Hochverrat in wartime Austria-Hungary gained its power148
because, alongside a strong rhetoric about treason from July 1914, the149
accusation lay within a firm legal framework. This matched the idea of150
the Austro-Hungarian monarchy after 1867 as a Rechtsstaat, a state where151
its citizens had equal protection under the law. The major penal code152
remained the Austrian code of 1852, completed during the decade of153
dynastic neo-absolutism. Hungary issued its own criminal code in 1878,154
relying heavily on German and French models, but it was the Austrian155
that remained valid for most treason trials of the First World War.18156
Under this code, the relevant paragraph was §58. Like all treason157
laws on the European continent, §58 incorporated major threats to both158
internal and external state security, and especially matched imperial159
Russia’s definition of the crime.19 Treason under §58 had three key objects.160
The first clause (§58a) protected the monarch’s physical safety, defining161
it as treason to injure or endanger the person of the emperor. Unlike in162
England or Italy, this did not cover other members of the imperial family,163
so the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo in 1914 was164
not in itself a treasonable act. Nor did simple abuse or disrespect towards165
the monarch constitute treason: since the 1780s, Majesta¨tsbeleidigung, which166
17 There have been few attempts to conceptualise the modern history of treason, but see
Ben-Yehuda, Betrayals and Treason, and Thomas Noetzel, Die Faszination des Verrats. Eine Studie
zur Dekadenz im Ost-West-Konflikt (Hamburg, 1989). Cf. the plentiful studies for early modern
England, such as John Bellamy, The Tudor Law of Treason: An Introduction (1979), and Lisa
Steffen, Defining a British State: Treason and National Identity, 1608–1820 (Basingstoke, 2001).
18 Josef Prusˇa´k, Rakousko pra´vo trestnı´ (Prague, 1912), 14. The territory of Croatia-Slavonia
(autonomous under Hungary) retained the Austrian 1852 code with some Croatian
amendments. The code was also introduced in Bosnia-Hercegovina after its occupation
in 1878.
19For the following, see the comparative discussion by Franz van Calker, ‘Hochverrat
und Landesverrat’, in Vergleichende Darstellung des deutschen und ausla¨ndischen Strafrechts. Vorarbeiten
zur deutschen Strafrechtsreform, ed. Karl Birkmeyer, Fritz van Calker, Reinhard Frank et al.,
Besonderer Teil, I (Berlin, 1906), 2–71. Also, Das Strafgesetz, ed. Altmann, 60–5, and
Wolfgang Pfeifer, ‘Der Hochverrat im o¨sterreichischen Strafrecht vom 18.Jahrhundert bis
zur Gegenwart’ (Ph.Diss, Graz, 2008), 120–30.
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might include refusing to shake the emperor’s hand as well as more167
open hostility in word or deed, had been down-graded and codified168
separately.20 The second clause (§58b) made it treason to instigate a169
violent change of government; most famously it was employed in 1870170
against Austrian socialists who had demonstrated in the streets of Vienna171
and were deemed to have a violent revolutionary purpose.21 Both of172
these clauses had existed since the Austrian criminal code of 1803. Both173
conceived treason as the attempted as well as the completed act, so there174
was no such thing as ‘attempted treason’.175
But it was the third clause (§58c) which the Habsburg authorities would176
wield most persistently during the Great War since it tied the empire’s177
existence to an external threat. All the major wartime trials were based178
on this rubric of territorial treason (Gebietshochverrat) which had originated179
in the mid-nineteenth century in the unstable aftermath of the 1848180
revolutions. Under §58c, treason was defined vaguely not only as causing181
a danger to the external security of the state (as in the 1803 code), but as182
fomenting civil war at home or – most significantly – as working to detach183
a part of the imperial territory.22 The attempted act was again akin to184
the act itself; the crime might be committed in speech, word or deed,185
with or without violence. So there was ample scope in §58c for clever186
lawyers to twist treason to match the state’s political objectives. Even if187
many of these clauses had exact parallels in other European penal codes188
(Russian or Italian for example), Austrian law was still one of the severest189
in Europe, prescribing execution by hanging for all forms of treason.190
Traitors in the Magyar half of the empire were luckier since Hungarian191
law, though similar, was more precise and only a physical attack on the192
king required the death penalty.23193
It was therefore §58 which was the major legal basis for Hochverrat194
and, as with the English Treason Act of 1351, its vagueness or potential195
for politicised ‘construction’ laid it open to abuse. Indeed, in the decade196
before the Great War, several Austrian jurists had pointed out the dangers197
inherent in §58 and argued for a complete overhaul of a penal code much198
of which was over a century old. In 1913, the Austrian minister of justice199
20Philip Czech, Der Kaiser ist ein Lump und Spitzbube. Majesta¨tsbeleidigung unter Kaiser Franz
Joseph (Vienna, Cologne and Weimar, 2010), 66–80.
21 Herbert Steiner, ‘Der Wiener Hochverratsprozess 1870’, in Sozialistenprozesse: Politische
Justiz in O¨sterreich 1870–1936 , ed. Karl R. Stadler (Vienna, 1986), 13–30.
22Pfeifer, Der Hochverrat im o¨sterreichischen Strafrecht, 120–1, 128–9. Contemporary legal
commentaries noted that Austrian law, unlike German, French or Italian, had no specific
conception of Landesverrat (betraying state security), but partly subsumed it into Hochverrat in
§58c: see Calker, ‘Hochverrat und Landesverrat, 11, 63.
23See the Hungarian Criminal Code of 1878 (§126–38). §126–7 covered almost exactly the
same fields as the Austrian §58 but were more detailed with special protection for Hungarian
territory. For a German translation: Das ungarische Strafgesetzbuch u¨ber Verbrechen und Vergehen,
tr. Gustav Steinbach (Budapest, 1878), 30–3. My thanks to Attila Barna for this source.
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had told the Upper House of the Austrian Reichsrat that the law failed200
to reflect the major transformation that had occurred in the past century201
in relations between citizens and the state.24202
Yet apart from §58, the Austrian penal code supplied other ways to203
prosecute acts which some might term ‘treason’ as a threat to state security.204
These included the vague political crime of ‘disturbing public order’205
(equivalent to English ‘sedition’) through refusing to obey state law or206
inciting hatred of the regime. But most sinister was §67, the so-called207
‘crimes against the war power of the state’. This covered a range of208
precise acts such as espionage, but also any behaviour designed to benefit209
the enemy in time of war.25 In short, it was a licence for arbitrary justice210
against civilians when the wartime state was anxious about disloyalty. We211
can glimpse this extended treason early in Jaroslav Hasˇek’s novel Good212
Soldier Sˇvejk, when Sˇvejk is suddenly arrested for ‘high treason’ by the213
wily detective Bretschneider. Sˇvejk had hardly violated §58 but a vigilant214
security officer might well interpret his mad pronouncements as falling215
within a constructed definition. In contrast, the words Sˇvejk uttered later216
in a casual conversation with a fellow-soldier over coffee were more clearly217
treacherous: ‘A monarchy as idiotic as this ought not to exist at all.’26218
II219
Hasˇek’s main target for satire – the vigilant Habsburg policeman or army220
officer – appears quite accurate. For with the outbreak of war in 1914,221
the Habsburg state, armed with new emergency powers to curb dissent,222
was paranoid about any outsiders to the patriotic community. A statistic223
for Vienna alone suggests that cases of political crime including treason,224
normally eighteen per year, rose twelve-fold in 1914.27 The reality was not225
that more Hochverrat was being committed, but that the army from July226
1914 was overwhelmingly responsible for interpreting and prosecuting227
this crime. The military always claimed that they were impartial because228
they were supposedly non-political in their exercise of justice.28 But229
24AU´TGM, Fond Maffie, karton 39, XIII: Eduard Ko¨rner concluding speech at the
Krama´rˇ trial, 4230–2.
25Das Strafgesetz, ed. Altmann, 65–6. The ‘Verbrechen wider die Kriesgmacht des Staates’
(§67) found greater exposition in the military penal code of 1855, §304–31. See Das Milita¨r-
Strafgesetz u¨ber Verbrechen und Vergehen vom 15 Ja¨nner 1855 samt den einschla¨gigen und erga¨nzenden
Gesetzen und Verordnungen, ed. Alexander Koller (2nd edn, Vienna, 1901), 229–40.
26Jaroslav Hasˇek, The Good Soldier Sˇvejk (Harmondsworth, 1974), 13, 207–8. Bretschneider
(p. 50) had vainly tried to inveigle Sˇvejk into admitting that the empire was doomed to
extinction.
27Franz Exner, Krieg und Kriminalita¨t in O¨sterreich (Vienna, 1927), 26.
28See Jonathan Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918
(Cambridge, 2009), 117–18, 126ff.
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their behaviour matched an obsessive wartime agenda of safeguarding230
efficiency at the expense of civilian freedom, as well as a very entrenched231
set of pre-war national prejudices. For most of the war, at least until the232
summer of 1917, they could control the machinery of treason due to the233
powers they suddenly acquired.234
With the empire now split into ‘war-zone’ and ‘hinterland’, it was in235
the former that the military authorities assumed quasi-dictatorial powers.236
This eventually meant a huge swathe of territory, excluding only greater237
Hungary and four of the Austrian crownlands but including those regions238
closest to the enemy. It is true that martial law was not absolute in the war239
zone: the military authorities were still supposed to work with the civilian,240
and concepts of the Rechtsstaat were never wholly abandoned.29 Even so,241
the powers transferred by imperial decree in July 1914 placed all civilians242
under military jurisdiction for all political crimes, including treason,243
espionage, ‘disturbing public order’ and even Majesta¨tsbeleidigung.30 The244
result was an arbitrary interpretation of these crimes with devastating245
results for any civilians who obstructed the army machinery. In the first246
months of the war, the Army High Command (Armeeoberkommando: AOK)247
simply abandoned the military judicial rulebook introduced in 1912; it248
returned to an inquisitorial form of trial and widespread use of the court-249
martial or ‘summary justice’ (Standrecht). The court-martial required no250
preliminary investigation of the case, the advantage was wholly with the251
prosecution; the only sentence for a guilty verdict was the death penalty252
which had to be carried out within two hours.253
This draconian procedure was now applied to all those officially254
charged with political crimes in the war zone. One calculation, based255
on the cases registered by the War Ministry in Vienna, suggests about256
1,900 court-martial deaths, of which 60 per cent were civilian. About 88257
people were executed for Hochverrat, but 351 for the much vaguer ‘crime258
against the army at war’.31 Some would die for the most minor forms of259
disloyalty. Thus, a man from Ljubljana, who in June 1915 publicly praised260
Italy and called the Germans pigs, was found guilty under §65 (‘disturbing261
public order’); he was executed despite pleading intoxication at the time.32262
These summary trials fell mainly in 1915–16. We can compare them with263
a far more alarming figure for those civilians who, in the first months264
of hostilities, were called traitors and executed without trial. It is now265
accepted that as the front initially wavered against the Serbian and266
29See Christoph Fu¨hr, Das k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando und die Innenpolitik in O¨sterreich 1914–1917
(Graz and Vienna, 1968), 21 (n. 49), 88, 181; and Gumz, Resurrection, 140.
30Joseph Redlich, Austrian War Government (New Haven, 1929), 81–2.
31 Karl Platzer, Standrechtliche Todesurteile im Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin and Stuttgart, 2004),
71–8.
32Ibid., 160.
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Russian armies, the Habsburg forces committed mass atrocities against267
Serb and Ruthene (Ukrainian) civilians who seemed to be in collusion268
with the enemy. It seems hard to believe a staggering figure of 30,000269
Ruthene executions, even if in September 1914 the chief of the general270
staff himself declared Ruthene territory to be an enemy land. But in the271
south, the empire’s Serbs were certainly stereotyped as constituting a272
‘mass mobilization of high treason’; as Habsburg troops advanced and273
retreated, over 3,000 Serb civilians near the frontline were summarily274
executed in a few weeks.33 Only later did this chaos give way to the legal275
device of the summary court-martial.276
For the military, the ultimate traitors were those who colluded with277
the enemy and especially dangerous were those suspected of an openly278
irredentist ideology. Here, the most notorious traitor to suffer summary279
justice was the Italian Cesare Battisti. His case reveals well the regime’s280
dilemma of how best to manage prominent displays of treason.34 Battisti’s281
story was mythologised at the time and since because of the post-war282
division of Austrian Tyrol in Italy’s favour. For Italians, and Mussolini’s283
fascist state, the treason could be celebrated as national martyrdom. For284
German-Austrians, Battisti personified ‘perfidious Italy’, the ally that had285
betrayed Austria-Hungary by changing sides in May 1915; in their eyes, he286
had been legally tried and deserved his fate. Battisti was certainly unusual287
as a well-known irredentist who met his end on the scaffold. At the start288
of the war, like some other outspoken parliamentary deputies – the Croat289
Frano Supilo or the Czech Toma´sˇ Masaryk – he had crossed the imperial290
frontier, feeling like them that Austria-Hungary was doomed; it could not291
be reformed and the solution was national liberation at the side of the292
western Allies. For all these public traitors, Austrian military intelligence293
began to amass files of incriminating evidence, and an indictment of294
Hochverrat under §58c was slowly pieced together. Only in Battisti’s case295
was the effort rewarded, for on 11 July 1916 he was captured fighting for296
Italy on Monte Corno and immediately taken to Trento to be court-297
martialled.298
Subsequent events showed how gingerly the regime needed to tread299
when processing state betrayal. For if the public arraignment of a300
treacherous leader might act as a deterrent, as the military insisted, it301
could also produce a martyr.35 In Battisti’s case, the authorities typically302
had tried to discredit him beforehand, leaking tales of embezzlement303
33For an exaggerated claim of up to 30,000 Ruthene persecution: Alexander Watson,
Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary at War 1914–1918 (2014), 155. For Serb persecution:
Gumz, Resurrection, 34–58.
34For the following, see Oswald U¨beregger, Der andere Krieg. Die Tiroler Milita¨rgerichtsbarkeit
im Ersten Weltkrieg (Innsbruck, 2002), 366–86.
35See Kirchheimer, Political Justice, 7–8.
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although in fact it was a cast-iron case of treason under §58 (with the304
added sin that Battisti had deserted to Italy when liable for conscription305
at home). The verdict after the brief court-martial on 12 July therefore306
spoke of the ‘worst and most ignominious treason to the fatherland’. It was307
the de´nouement that then backfired, for Battisti was publicly humiliated308
when alive and dead. Led out to execution only two hours after the309
verdict, he was surrounded by troops who shouted abuse, scoffing and310
jeering when the condemned man cried out that he died as an Italian311
not as an Austrian. While the news of this scene soon leaked out to the312
public, even more damning were the postcards that circulated displaying313
Battisti’s corpse alongside grinning faces. The Austrian satirist Karl Kraus314
condemned this grisly display of ‘self- satisfied cosiness (Gemu¨tlichkeit)’. But315
the Austrian military welcomed the postcards as a useful propaganda tool,316
to justify very starkly why the empire had gone to war with Italy.36 The317
picture’s mixed reception showed that by 1916 it was impossible to bridge318
the divide in how treason was being interpreted across Austro-Hungarian319
society.320
While the military prosecuted treason in the war zone quite arbitrarily,321
albeit with a legal veneer, in the Austrian ‘hinterland’ – the four Bohemian322
and Austrian crownlands – they had no such special powers and had to323
act more cautiously. Repeatedly in the first year of the war, the AOK324
pressed Count Stu¨rgkh, the Austrian prime minister, to extend martial325
law into the hinterland in order to deal with treacherous civilian elements.326
Czech traitors in Bohemia should just be court-martialled with no right327
of appeal.37 Although this campaign was always rebuffed, it is not true328
that the AOK lacked any power outside the war zone.38 Since all political329
crimes now fell under military jurisdiction, in the hinterland too those330
crimes had to be tried in military courts. The result was substantial331
military control even if the civilian judiciary could try to temper the332
proceedings; from 1914 to 1916, the number of cases tried by military333
courts in the hinterland rose from 2,000 to 23,000.39334
III335
How this affected the prosecution of traitors is clear from the large-336
scale treason trials to which we now turn. Those organised in Bosnia, in337
the war zone, had a foregone conclusion. In the hinterland, in Vienna or338
Zagreb, the military authorities had to work harder to secure a conviction339
but still had overriding legal control. In particular, through the wartime340
36U¨beregger, Der andere Krieg, 384–6.
37See Fu¨hr, Armeeoberkommando, 34ff, 91–7.
38Cf. ibid., 22.
39Manfried Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie (Vienna,
2013), 452.
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emergency laws, they found ways to intervene and preemptively arrest341
suspected traitors. This occurred usually with Czech suspects, like the342
Czech National Socialist leader Va´clav Klofa´cˇ, who was arrested in343
September 1914 and incarcerated without trial for almost three years.344
By 1917, he was being earmarked for a monster treason trial that never345
took place.40346
The essence of the treason trial, like all political trials, was not just347
about enforcing the law, but about incriminating domestic enemies so that348
they could be eliminated. Under §58, this was terminal since the death349
penalty always applied. By convicting key public figures from either the350
Czech or Serb communities, the regime also aimed to deter, to sound a351
warning-shot, to assert a normative Habsburg patriotism at the expense352
of any other competing allegiances. It might be argued that under the353
law many of those indicted were indeed traitors (for instance Klofa´cˇ),354
but even so – as in the trials of Casement in England or Joseph Caillaux355
in France – there was considerable ‘construction’ of the law to secure356
a conviction. And some of the Habsburg prosecutors went even further.357
Determined to convict, they stretched the evidence and sometimes in358
the courtroom manufactured an ‘alternative reality’ to explain traitors’359
behaviour. This foreshadowed the techniques of totalitarian show-trials360
later in the century. The difference in Austro-Hungarian treason trials361
was that a defence lawyer was permitted, so there was some slight chance362
of acquittal.41363
Yet the monarchy’s political trials were not a wartime novelty nor a364
purely military instrument. In peacetime before 1914, several high-profile365
treason trials had been staged, notably against Serbs and Ruthenes. They366
suggest an empire already in crisis, which needed publicly to arraign367
the ‘disloyal’ in order to shore up its security. They also showed the real368
difficulty of defining treason, an uncertainty which could work to the369
advantage of both protagonists. In the notorious Zagreb treason trial of370
1909, which lasted 150 days, 53 Serbs from Croatia were charged with371
treason under §58c and 31were eventually found guilty.42 The prosecutor’s372
remit was to stigmatise a broad swathe of Croatia’s Serbs and he twisted373
the evidence accordingly. Among the observers was R. W. Seton-Watson374
(a later president of the Royal Historical Society) who sat in the courtroom375
for three weeks. Calling it ‘one of the grossest travesties of justice in376
modern times’, on a par with the Dreyfus scandal, he found it hard to377
40Obzˇalovacı´ spis proti Va´clav Klofa´cˇovi a Rudolfu Giuniovi pro zlocˇin [velezra´dy] dle §58c tr. z., ed.
Zdeneˇk V. Tobolka (Prague, 1919), viii–x.
41 Kirchheimer, Political Justice, 46–8.
42For context, especially on the rhetoric of treason, see Mark Cornwall, ‘Loyalty
and Treason in Late Habsburg Croatia: A Violent Political Discourse before the First
World War’, in Semantiken und Praktiken von Loyalita¨ten, ed. Martin Schulze-Wessel and Jana
Osterkamp (Munich, 2015).
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believe that high treason in Austria-Hungary had ‘not yet been consigned378
to the lumber-room of medieval phrases’.43 The Czech Toma´sˇ Masaryk379
agreed, warning the Austrian parliament in May 1909 about the danger380
of using the term Hochverrat, an anachronistic phrase from a bygone age.44381
In fact, many statesmen and army officers in the Habsburg regime382
did see treason as a very present danger. In early 1914, two major trials383
were held of radical ‘old Ruthenes’, Russophile Ukrainians from the384
empire’s eastern provinces. They were all accused of plotting with pan-385
Slavists from Russia to detach Austro-Hungarian territory. Although the386
evidence pointed strongly towards a guilty verdict, a conviction depended387
on whether simply spreading propaganda was equivalent to treason.45 At388
the second trial held in Lwow (Lemberg) in Galicia, the prosecutor argued389
that the cultural-humanitarian work of the ‘traitors’ (using Russian funds)390
had simply been a cover for a political plot. Typically, the Austrian press391
described the accused as outsiders: one as a character from a Dostoevsky392
novel, another as ‘a shabby little man’ whose eyes one would never393
forget.46 In the end, however, the jury composed of Poles proceeded394
to acquit these ‘traitors’. It was a set-back for the civilian authorities, a395
sign that wielding the treason law was a risky business. Vienna’s leading396
newspaper advised ‘that political trials generally do not tend to achieve397
their aims’; intensive education in Galician villages was the real solution.47398
But it was a warning from peacetime not heeded when the war began.399
Military courts then could envisage more success, for no juries would be400
involved in the proceedings.401
Of the main wartime treason trials, those against Serb and Czech402
civilians gained most notoriety and have left the most evidence. The403
charge of §58c, where the domestic traitor was conspiring with an external404
danger, now had real resonance as Austria-Hungary was facing attack on405
three military fronts. As the military authorities gathered evidence and406
made new paranoid connections, the phenomenon of treason snowballed.407
By 1917, they imagined it as one monstrous enterprise spanning the408
empire, a tree with deep pre-war roots whose poisonous buds were only409
just blossoming. In the vivid simile of Edward Coke, these buds needed410
43R. W. Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question (1911), 184, 208.
44Thomas G. Masaryk, Der Agramer Hochverratsprozess und die Annexion von Bosnien und
Herzegovina (Vienna, 1909), 30–1: speech to the Reichsrat on 14 May 1909.
45For context, see Z. A. B. Zeman, The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire 1914–1918: A Study
in National and Social Revolution (London, New York and Toronto, 1961), 3–11.
46‘Russophile Agitatoren vor den Lemberger Geschworen’, Neue Freie Presse (Abendblatt),
3 June 1914, 4; Berthold Merwin, ‘Bilder vom Lemberger Hochverratsprozess’, ibid.
(Abendblatt), 9 June 1914, 3.
47 ‘Freispruch der Angeklagten im Lemberger Hochverratsprozeß’, ibid. (Morgenblatt),
7 June 1914, 2.
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‘blasting and nipping’ before they ripened and brought ‘utter destruction411
and desolation upon the whole State’.48412
It was in Sarajevo in October 1914 that the first of the political413
confrontations was staged. On trial were Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko414
Cˇabrinovic´ and twenty-three other men associated with the assassination415
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. The charge, however, was not416
one of murder, but Hochverrat under §111 (the Bosnian equivalent of §58)417
as this would carry the death penalty for those who had both planned418
and executed the treacherous deed.49 In this setting, the broader political419
objective was clear. The accused were brought to the courtroom in chains420
and surrounded by soldiers with bayonets at the ready; in the distance421
the echo of gunfire from the front was a constant reminder that this422
treason had led to war.50 For the prosecution, it was vital to show that423
the assassins were not lone fanatics but pawns in a vast plot organised by424
the Serbian enemy to detach Bosnia from the Habsburg monarchy. Their425
conviction would not just be a matter of justice: it would publicly justify426
Austria-Hungary’s war against that international traitor, Serbia. It was427
with this aim that behind the scenes the Habsburg foreign minister, Count428
Berchtold, wanted pressure put on the court so that it was mindful of the429
current clash with Serbia.51 The prosecutor duly argued that the assassins430
were revolutionaries committed to violence, unfortunate wretches who431
resembled an ulcer in a healthy body. But above all, they were tools of a432
huge Serbian plot, which had operated for years in Bosnia-Hercegovina433
via a range of allegedly ‘cultural societies like Narodna Odbrana or the434
Sokol (gymnastics) association. The prosecution equated membership of435
one of these societies with the preparation of treason. In short, ‘Great436
Serb propaganda [was] in itself treason.’52437
In this atmosphere, the defence lawyers had an impossible task, for a438
guilty verdict seemed inevitable. The presiding judge even rebuked one439
lawyer for being too solicitous of criminals ‘who by tomorrow would440
be condemned to death for treason’.53 Nor did the young assassins help441
themselves for most were determined to confess their guilt. Typically, they442
inverted the label of ‘traitor’ by claiming to have acted in response to the443
treachery of Habsburg rule; due to that tyranny in Bosnia, they wanted444
to destroy the empire and achieve South Slav unification. Their case was445
48A True and Perfect Relation of the Whole Proceedings, D4.
49The most accurate trial transcript is in Sarajevski atentat. Stenogram Glavne rasprave protiv
Gavrila Principa i drugova, ed. Vojislav Bogic´evic´ (Sarajevo, 1954). Some historians have used
unreliable transcripts: e.g. Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in
1914 (2012), 51–5.
50Rudolf Zistler, Kako sam branio Principa i drugove 1914 godine (Ljubljana, 1937), 4, 17.
51 Vladimir Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo (1966), 336.
52Speech of prosecutor Franjo Sˇvara: Sarajevski atentat, 332–42.
53Zistler, Kako sam branio Principa, 4.
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also not aided by many of their own defence lawyers. One, who was a446
Croat, spent a long time lambasting the Serbs, regretting that he had447
to represent men who had dug the grave not only of Franz Ferdinand448
but of the Croatian nation.54 A general defence argument, however, was449
to question the defendants’ actual intentions. It had not been proven450
that the assassins, let alone their accomplices, had intended to commit451
Gebietshochverrat when murdering the heir-apparent. As silly teenagers,452
with heads in the clouds, they did not really know what they were doing.453
On the defence team, it was the lawyer Rudolf Zistler who tried most454
diligently to challenge the prosecution case. He too focused on the issue455
of intent, arguing that under Austrian law treason required an overt act to456
be committed; instead, the prosecutor was ‘constructing’ treason through457
mere association with Serb propaganda or Yugoslav dreams. As Zistler458
vividly noted, ‘If you say you are a supporter of Plato’s ideal state or459
the utopia of Thomas More – that does not make you a traitor.’55 The460
act of killing Franz Ferdinand in fact could only be defined as ‘political461
murder’, not ‘treason’, for despite what Princip and others were now462
claiming, there was no clear proof that they expected the murders to463
result in the secession of Bosnia from the state.464
Zistler, however, then probed even more deeply, challenging the465
indictment’s whole political and legal framework. First, he urged the466
court to see the trial in the context of recent national developments, for467
‘in our monarchy unfortunately treason trials recur in a steady periodic468
cycle, like a chronic illness’.56 He then delivered his legal coup de graˆce.469
Although Bosnia had been annexed by Austria-Hungary in 1908, the470
union had never been formally ratified by the Austrian or Hungarian471
parliaments. As a result, he argued, Bosnia was still not yet legally part472
of the empire, so it was impossible to commit the crime of treason in473
breaking it away from the state.57474
Zistler’s clever stance did not save his defendants from the gallows.475
Instead, it earned him several rebukes from the presiding judge and led to476
his expulsion from Bosnia after the trial because of his ‘hostile disposition’.477
At the end of his speech, he had appealed to history and to justice, but the478
courtroom in the belligerent context of October 1914 ignored this, leaving479
him to describe the overall result as ‘legal murder’.58 Not surprisingly, a480
century later (2014) Zistler’s arguments would be exploited by Bosnian481
Serb nationalists, including the film director Emir Kusturica, in a crude482
54Speech of Konstantin Premuzˇic´: Sarajevski atentat, 351–4. See also the minimal defence
given to the assassin Trifko Grabezˇ: ibid., 364.
55Zistler speech: Sarajevski atentat, 378.
56Ibid., 368.
57 Ibid., 369–72. See also Zistler, Kako sam branio Principa, 13: ‘The verdict could not construct
a treasonable intention to destroy the annexation [which was] an illegal situation.’
58Ibid., 15.
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campaign to try to overturn the court verdict and canonise their Serb483
hero Gavrilo Princip.59484
While the Sarajevo trial was at least one of criminal assassins, the mass485
treason trials that mushroomed across Bosnia in 1915–16 were legally far486
more questionable. It is unclear how many were caught up in this judicial487
hysteria but it certainly reached into the hundreds. Serbian historians have488
struggled to explain the political meaning, suggesting even that behind the489
trials lay some grand purpose by the Habsburg military to wipe out Serb490
intellectuals as a prelude to reforming the empire radically.60 The reality491
was probably more prosaic: a military regime convinced that the Bosnian492
Serb population was riddled with staatsfeindliche elements. Certainly, the493
Sarajevo trial, after an intense inquiry into Serb irredentism, gave the494
authorities obvious ‘traitors’ to pursue. The new trials that started the495
following spring were in two main groups. The first targeted the Serb496
omladina or youth organisations, seeing in them the hothouses that had497
produced fanatics like Princip. The second – three major trials – were498
more politically weighty, indicting several hundred of the Bosnian Serb499
intelligentsia. All these court-cases interpreted propaganda as treason:500
that working to raise Serb national consciousness, via societies like Narodna501
Odbrana or Sokol, was akin to plotting the annexation of Bosnia by Serbia.502
That link might be tendentious, dependent on a construct of the treason503
law, but there is no doubt that the military authorities believed in their own504
arguments. They thought (wrongly) that Narodna Odbrana was the terrorist505
organisation that had planned the archduke’s murder. Mistrust of all Serbs506
was ubiquitous: according to one of Bosnia’s wartime governors, only a507
third were loyal while another third were trying to give the impression of508
loyalty.61509
Yet there was a deeper meaning to this political theatre, organised510
in the war zone by a military power that could manipulate the court511
personnel to its advantage. Alongside the brutal arrests there was, as even512
one of the Sarajevo assassins noted, some evidence of the Rechtsstaat in513
operation.62 The larger purpose, glimpsed already in the Sarajevo trial,514
was to justify publicly Austria-Hungary’s war in the Balkans, consistently515
underlining the traitors’ place in Serbia’s international plot. Thus, in the516
59See for example, http://www.invest-in-serbia.com/archive/general/1391910600-
kusturica-to-seek-annulment-of-gavrilo-princip-s-trial.html (accessed 31 Aug. 2014).
60Milorad Ekmecˇic´, ‘“Zˇalosna basˇtina iz godine 1914” (Politicˇke namjene sudskih procesa
u Bosni i Hercegovini za vrijeme prvog svjetskog rata)’, in Veleizdajnicˇki proces u Banjaluci, 13,
40.
61 Ibid., 32. See also the memoirs of Stefan Freiherr Sarkotic´ von Lovc´en, ‘Der
Hochverrats-Prozeß von Banjaluka’, Berliner Monatshefte fu¨r internationale Aufkla¨rung, 7/1 (Jan.
1929), 33–4.
62Vasa Cˇubrilovic´, ‘Razmisˇljanja o veleizdajnicˇkim procesima u prvom svetskom ratu’,
in Veleizdajnicˇki process u Banjaluci, 4.
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famous Banjaluka trial, which arraigned 156 intellectuals over six months,517
the seeds of treason had supposedly been planted over a decade earlier518
and had flourished through espionage and propaganda before the war.519
The actual evidence at the trial was slight and wholly circumstantial: a520
list of names in some documents seized by Habsburg troops in Serbia.521
Yet none of the defence arguments had any effect in the face of political522
manipulation from Vienna and Sarajevo. In April 1916, sixteen men were523
handed the death penalty, commuted to life imprisonment a year later.63524
IV525
It is useful now to juxtapose how Austria-Hungary treated Czech traitors526
compared to Serb. After the war, much of this national treason lost527
its pejorative edge, the traitors became heroes, and in their memoirs528
they took care to minimise their wartime opportunism. In August 1914,529
the Czech population, in comparison to Serbs or Ruthenes, was not530
immediately suspect to the military authorities for there was no obvious531
irredentist threat. Even so, according to §58 certain Czech politicians532
were indeed already traitors. Va´clav Klofa´cˇ for example was not just533
a virulent pre-war critic of the empire but in early 1914 had plotted534
in Russia to organise an underground Czech resistance should war535
break out; in September, after returning from an American lecture tour536
full of treasonable speeches, he was arrested and locked up without537
charge.64 Only thereafter did the military begin to stigmatise Czechs as538
unreliable. The main reason was clear evidence that some Czech troops539
were performing weakly at the front, seemingly due to Czech civilian540
disloyalty in the hinterland. After repeatedly failing to impose martial law541
on Bohemia, the AOK in May 1915 finally pounced.65 Two key Czech542
politicians, Karel Krama´rˇ and Alois Rasˇı´n, were arrested. A treason case543
was carefully constructed against them in Vienna, resulting in the most544
impressive European treason trial of the whole war.545
Much later in the 1920s, when the young actor Otto Preminger (the546
later film director) appeared in a play in the Czechoslovak capital of547
Prague, he decided temporarily to change his surname. For his father548
Markus had been Austria’s public prosecutor, a hate figure to many549
Czechs as chief prosecutor in the Krama´rˇ trial. Markus Preminger was550
an outsider in many ways. A Jew, from the eastern-most province of the551
63See ibid.: Dzˇenana Cˇausˇevic´, ‘“Veleizdajnici” na sudskom procesu u Banjaluci i u
zatvorima’, 369–85.
64See Bohuslav Sˇantru˚cˇek, Va´clav Klofa´cˇ (1868–1928) (Prague, 1928), and Milada Paulova´,
Deˇjiny Maffie. Odboj Cˇechu˚ a Jihoslavanu˚ za sveˇtove´ va´lky 1914–1918, I (Prague, 1937), 27ff, 113–15.
65Fu¨hr, Armeeoberkommando, 47–8; Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg, 355–60, 444. For the
mythology around Czech military treason: Richard Lein, Pflicherfu¨llung oder Hochverrat? Die
tschechischen Soldaten O¨sterreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna, 2011).
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monarchy, he had taken part in early 1914 in prosecuting Russophile552
traitors and had then fled westwards as the Russian armies invaded. He553
would always divide opinion for he publicly personified a supranational554
German-Jewish loyalty in the face of nationalist treachery. One Czech555
historian described him as ‘a marvellous speaker, a master of rhetoric, but556
an unscrupulous and egotistical Bukovina Jew’.66 One English supporter557
noted in retrospect Preminger’s ‘sharp mind and acid wit’, a man558
hardened to anti-Semitic abuse who had ‘led the prosecution of Dr559
Kramarz (which in German rhymes with “arse”)’.67560
In May 1915, Karel Krama´rˇ was targeted by the military as the561
leading Czech traitor. The timing coincided with Italy’s entry into the562
war, but also with a notorious case of Czech ‘mass-desertion’ on the563
eastern front (infantry regiment 28). Krama´rˇ’s arrest in fact was a knee-564
jerk reaction after months of military anxiety. The last straw was news565
that he had secretly (and stupidly) met the Italian consul in Prague,566
but most significant was his political background, as a leading Czech567
statesman who had constantly been advocating Slav unity and Russian568
friendship. Krama´rˇ was married to a Russian and regularly holidayed in569
the Crimea. Before 1914, he had been the leading promoter of so-called570
‘Neo-Slavism’, a cultural movement to foster closer Slav cooperation571
across Eastern Europe in the face of German dominance. ‘Neo-Slavism’572
was not inherently anti-Habsburg, but it had an underlying political573
agenda as Krama´rˇ hoped to re-balance the Austro-Hungarian empire574
in favour of its Slav majority. Yet its real prerequisite was a much closer575
international alliance between Austria and Russia, a dream that was576
scuppered because of the Bosnian crisis of 1909 followed by the Balkan577
Wars.68 Just as Neo-Slavism rapidly disintegrated before 1914, so for578
Krama´rˇ the outbreak of a European war was a disaster: Russia, his chief579
Slav ally, was now the official state enemy. He felt it impossible publicly580
to espouse loyalty to the monarchy alongside the German empire. It581
was on this basis, and a retrospective interpretation of Krama´rˇ’s pre-war582
behaviour, that Preminger would try to unmask him as a long-term traitor.583
From the start, Preminger felt that Krama´rˇ could certainly be accused584
of ‘crimes against the war power of the state’, for ‘as leader of the Czech585
people he has undoubtedly failed to fulfil the heighted patriotic obligation586
of these serious times’. But a charge under §58 for Hochverrat was also likely.587
Already on Krama´rˇ’s arrest in Prague, evidence had been seized showing588
his links to the Czech resistance movement now organised abroad by589
Toma´sˇ Masaryk. The reality was that Krama´rˇ was not a major player590
66Paulova´, Deˇjiny Maffie, 154. See also Frantisˇek Soukup, 28 Rˇijen 1918, I (Prague, 1928),
172: Preminger advanced in Austria as ‘a great legal star of the war’.
67Willi Frischauer, Behind the Scenes of Otto Preminger (1973), 26, 29, 40.
68See Paul Vysˇny´, Neo-Slavism and the Czechs 1898–1914 (Cambridge, 1977).
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in the Czech Maffie (the name assumed by the small resistance group at591
home) and was struggling with his own loyalties. However, on his arrest592
the police found incriminating material at his house: apart from twenty-593
four copies of the English Daily Mail, an edition of Nation Tche`que, the594
Czech independence journal produced in Paris by the historian Ernst595
Denis. Preminger saw treason in the mere possession of these enemy596
papers. But then there was Krama´rˇ’s highly suspicious meeting with the597
Italian consul, as well as a letter from Mrs Krama´rˇ, asking her husband598
to purchase a copy of Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall: clearly, she was599
expecting the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian empire. All this suggested600
to Preminger that Krama´rˇ had a ‘disloyal mentality’ which was probably601
criminal; further investigation was now needed to uncover the full extent602
of his conspiracy.69603
While Preminger meticulously set about preparing the indictment,604
Krama´rˇ and other Czech traitors were moved to the garrison prison605
in Vienna. The AOK had decided that all Czech political trials should606
be staged at the military court in Vienna, not in Prague. It ensured607
less collusion with Czech officialdom, and facilitated the coordination of608
treason material at the centre (for in the summer the major Russophile609
trial, which could not be staged in Galicia, took place in Vienna).70 After610
the war, the garrison prison, the ‘Prison of Death’, gained notoriety as611
epitomising Czech martyrdom and Austrian barbarism, even if by the612
standard of later regimes it was mildly oppressive. The traitors were left613
in solitary confinement for months, fully cut off from the world and wholly614
unsure about their fate while evidence was gathered against them. Some615
like Krama´rˇ did not cope well. Others like Alois Rasˇı´n remained stoical,616
quietly considering a martyr’s end. As a lawyer, he could smile at how the617
law was being reinterpreted, and took solace from reading War and Peace618
where man was portrayed as just a ‘speck of dust raised on the wheel of619
history’. Rasˇı´n sensed that the trial was a historic watershed and hoped620
(vainly) that historians would later pay it due notice.71621
The trial of Krama´rˇ and Rasˇı´n finally opened in December 1915 and622
lasted for a full six months.72 Like a theatre premiere, many flocked to get623
69AU´TGM, Fond Maffie, karton 44, Preminger to AOK (A 2162/15), 31 May 1915,
enclosing report.
70Kunz, Na´sˇ odboj, 57; Paulova´, Deˇjiny Maffie, 607.
71 Pameˇti Dr. Alois Rasˇı´n, ed. Ladislav Rasˇı´n (Prague, 1994), 127, 129, 135. See also the
memoirs of Jan Reznı´cˇek, Ve veˇzˇi smrt (Prague, n.d.), 48ff.
72There is no historical analysis of this trial in any language although the full transcript
was quickly translated into Czech: Proces dra Krama´rˇe a jeho prˇa´tel, ed. Zdeneˇk V. Tobolka
(5 vols., Prague, 1918–20). A rare study is Toma´sˇ W. Pavl´ıcˇek, ‘Politicum a marty´rium
v nejdelsˇı´m trestnı´m procesu prvnı´ sveˇtove´ va´lky. Stylizace a strategie beˇhem procesu s
Karlem Krama´rˇem’, in Karel Krama´rˇ (1860–1937). Zˇivot a dı´lo, ed. Jan Bı´lek and Lubosˇ Velek
(Prague, 2009), 344–66.
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seats although press coverage was outlawed. On trial was the fundamental624
question, personified by Krama´rˇ, of what constituted loyalty to the625
Habsburg monarchy in peace or war. The prosecution, after translating626
thousands of Czech documents into German and researching widely627
in university libraries, had an overwhelming amount of circumstantial628
evidence and fielded experts on military intelligence to prove that629
Krama´rˇ’s treason had damaged the army. For the defence, while Krama´rˇ630
himself pleaded his innocence at length, an array of Habsburg statesmen631
lined up to endorse his pro-Austrian character, including the former632
foreign minister Count Berchtold and the Austrian prime minister Count633
Stu¨rgkh.634
Preminger argued73 that these notable witnesses were irrelevant, for635
Krama´rˇ was a wily and manipulative individual who had been playing a636
double game for years; any support he had given the Austrian government637
before 1914 was purely opportunistic and a mask for treason. Crucial to638
the prosecution case was to tie together Krama´rˇ’s behaviour before and639
during the war in one enormous conspiracy. His Neo-Slavist movement640
was depicted retrospectively not as a failure, but as a successful plot to641
unite all Slavs under Russian leadership and destroy Austria-Hungary;642
his many speeches, his pre-war trips to Russia or Serbia, were trawled643
over to prove his close plotting with the monarchy’s Serb and Ruthene644
traitors. Indeed, the plot was Europe-wide, a ‘large criminal design’ if645
one factored in his ties to France and Italy and obvious sympathy for the646
arch-traitor Masaryk. While colluding with these enemies to violate §58,647
he had then set a depraved example for all Czechs at home, failing to648
display any patriotic loyalty. This had resulted in large numbers of Czech649
civilians being prosecuted for ‘political crimes’, and in mass desertions at650
the front. History, said Preminger, would judge this disgraceful example651
of treacherous seduction.74652
Krama´rˇ’s defence lawyer, Eduard Ko¨rner, proceeded to pick large653
holes in an indictment that rested on so many assumptions.75 His legal654
summing up typically attacked the vagueness of §58, asking like so many655
jurists before him whether it was appropriate for a modern state. He656
then questioned whether the crime had actually been committed either657
subjectively or objectively. Subjectively, there was little proof that Krama´rˇ658
through his actions was intending to transgress §58c. But objectively659
73The following draws on AU´TGM, Fond Maffie, karton 39, XIII, Preminger’s speech,
3790–846; and the indictment: Milita¨ranwalt des Milita¨rkommandanten in Wien (A
2162/15/960), Anklageschrift (Vienna, 1915).
74 Ibid., 111. Preminger referred here to official data for prosecutions under §58 which
showed that Czechs were most likely to be accused: AU´TGM, Fond Maffie, karton 2,
Glivitzky to Preminger, 27 May 1916.
75 See AU´TGM, Fond Maffie, karton 39, XIII: Ko¨rner speech, 4227–47.
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too the criteria were lacking. For as in England the crime of treason660
required an ‘overt deed’, and Ko¨rner – like lawyers in the Bosnian661
trials76 – queried whether spreading propaganda or writing newspaper662
articles could constitute a treasonable act. Nor was there proof that663
Krama´rˇ’s behaviour had actually influenced the Czech population as664
the prosecution maintained. There seemed to be no ‘causal nexus’665
between Krama´rˇ and Czech rebellion but just the ‘vague construction of666
a connection’.77667
On 3 June 1916, the military court gave its verdict: Krama´rˇ and668
Rasˇı´n were both found guilty of treason and sentenced to death pending669
appeals. As this was simply announced in the press without any comment,670
it stirred strong public emotions. Two Czech leaders, even if their671
loyalties were dubious, had been judged traitors to the community.672
Their Czech compatriots in Prague were now cowed and alarmed about673
future persecution; many would later claim that the verdict had been674
a judgement on the whole Czech nation, something that Preminger in675
court had precisely denied.78 German nationalists meanwhile tended to676
gloat, noting that, just like France’s Dreyfus affair, this moment was a677
fatal watershed for the Czech nation.79 The real danger however, in the678
middle of the war, was how this public stigmatisation might affect imperial679
cohesion. As the Austrian liberal Josef Redlich observed, the hostility of680
the Czechs would not be defused by death sentences, only by the state681
intervening wisely and sensitively; thus he predicted, the Krama´rˇ verdict682
was likely to be ‘the starting point for the most dangerous internal battles683
in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy’.80684
V685
The climax of our stroll in the landscape of treason brings us to the686
rehabilitation of these traitors. Usually, for such rehabilitation to be687
effective, it takes place after a full regime change when the traitor’s688
fortunes are reversed, or when the state sees fit to grant a magnanimous689
pardon from a position of strength. In July 1917, a year after the690
Krama´rˇ sentence, the new Habsburg emperor Karl suddenly announced691
a full amnesty for all those found guilty of political crimes. It meant692
the immediate release of Krama´rˇ and Rasˇı´n, and a halt to the other693
trials Preminger was organising for Czech traitors like Klofa´cˇ or the694
76For example, the defence lawyer Danilo Dimovic´ at the Banjaluka trial: Cˇausˇevicˇ, 380.
77 Ko¨rner speech, 4244–5.
78For a typical Czech nationalist reaction: Jan Hajsˇman, Cˇeska´ Mafie. Vzpomı´nky na odboj
doma (Prague, 1932), 222.
79Soukup, 28 Rˇijen 1918, I, 177–82.
80Josef Redlich, Schicksalsjahre O¨sterreichs. Die Erinnerungen und Tagebu¨cher Josef Redlichs 1869–
1936 , II (Vienna, 2011), 171.
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exiled Masaryk. From November 1916, Emperor Karl’s regime had695
been pursuing an idealistic new direction, dismantling military powers696
and reintroducing constitutional government. The amnesty, as his own697
personal decision after months of agonising about tendentious military698
justice, was meant to foster national reconciliation at home.81 Yet as many699
of his ministers warned, it seemed a foolhardy move when the ground had700
not been carefully prepared. Not only was a full amnesty granted with701
no preconditions to make the ‘traitors’ conform. The new regime acted702
from a position of weakness, when powerful national groups still existed703
who could publicly reject the rehabilitation. Most notably, could Krama´rˇ704
really be pardoned, a man whom many German-Austrians felt to be the705
‘incarnation of an anti-German policy’?82 The move further destabilised706
the state, for the regime failed to follow it up with a concerted policy of707
national reconciliation.708
Indeed, in the last year of war, the accusations of treason moved709
from the private courtroom back into the public domain and were710
particularly virulent between Czech and German-Austrian agitators.711
German-Austrian nationalists, having attacked the amnesty from the712
start, proceeded to publicise all examples of Czech wartime treason;713
they reproduced Preminger’s arguments and publicly labelled Krama´rˇ714
as ‘the dark demon who unleashed the world war’.83 The released715
Czech prisoners meanwhile were feˆted in their communities and could716
pose as national martyrs. Since the Austrian government increasingly717
backed a ‘German course’, banking on victory at the side of the German718
Reich, most Czech leaders began to narrow their allegiance in a national719
direction: moving from dual Czech-Austrian loyalty to simply backing720
Czech state independence. The result was clear by April 1918, when721
the Habsburg foreign minister Count Czernin made a tactless speech722
attacking Toma´sˇ Masaryk and warning of other such Czech traitors at723
home. In reply, the domestic Czech leaders rejected the label of traitors,724
but added that in fact there was no difference between themselves and725
Masaryk.84 In other words, the badge of treachery was one they were726
now proudly brandishing as their own.727
81Kaiser Karl. Perso¨nliche Aufzeichnungen, Zeugnisse und Dokumente, ed. Erich Feigl (Vienna and
Munich 1984), 206–7; and especially the vivid discussion in Arthur Graf Polzer-Hoditz,
Kaiser Karl. Aus der Geheimmappe seines Kabinettschefs (Vienna, 1929), 421–33.
82Joseph Maria Baernreither, Der Verfall des Habsburgerreiches und die deutschen Fragmente eines
politischen Tagebuchs 1897–1917 (Vienna, 1938), 231–3. Also Kirchheimer on political amnesties:
Political Justice, 405–6, 410–11.
83Friedrich Wichtl, Dr. Karl Kramarsch, der Anstifter des Weltkrieges (Munich, 1918), 4.
84Viktor Dyk, ‘Czernin’, Na´rodnı´ listy, 4 Apr. 1918, 1; and speech of Staneˇk, quoted in ibid.,
14 Apr. 1918, 1. Also Zeman, Break-Up, 175.
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Many have questioned the ‘meaning of treason’, often with728
unsatisfactory or vague conclusions.85 If we search for its meaning729
in wartime Austria-Hungary, we discover a fundamental conflict over730
allegiance within the state. Before 1914, a lively discourse of treason731
already existed and the regime was wielding this ultimate legal weapon732
to silence irredentist enemies within. The war intensified this trend as the733
empire, under military dominance, fought a largely defensive battle for734
survival. Once identified, the traitors were publicly paraded as monstrous735
‘outsiders’ who had supposedly plotted their evil schemes for decades.736
The aim was to assert a restricted version of imperial patriotism against737
any alternative visions, but also to justify to a European audience why738
Austria-Hungary had been forced to fight this total war. Ultimately then,739
treason meant a high-risk and dangerous power struggle. By 1918, it was740
the traitors who were gaining the upper hand and proudly turning the741
accusation on its head. Thus, as Jaroslav Kunz discovered when he went742
in search of those documents in Vienna, treason is always a transitory and743
constructed phenomenon. It constitutes an ideal subject for the historian744
who wishes to explain a regime in crisis.745
85See Rebecca West, The Meaning of Treason (1982), 413–20, who took a firm moral
stance against the traitor. One reviewer questioned whether she had actually explained
‘the meaning’: Journal of American History, 52.2 (1965), 421–2.
